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Working Paper: Is there a consistent pattern in benefit sanctions rates by Jobcentre Plus offices in Scotland?

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ABSTRACT

Within the debate on labour market activation policies and the public discussion on unemployment benefit sanctions and their effectiveness in raising transition rates back to employment, increasing attention has been paid on the role of caseworkers in employment offices. Caseworkers' behavioural decisions may be influenced by a combination of factors, such as available resources, personal characteristics and attitudes, which may lead to different sanction outcomes for unemployed people.

This working paper aims to identify whether there are consistent patterns in benefit sanctions rates across local employment offices (i.e. Jobcentre Plus offices) in Scotland. I used data from official UK government statistics covering monthly counts of unemployment benefit claimants and adverse sanctions for 93 Jobcentre Plus offices, for the period between April 2004 and September 2015. In this working paper, I provide a descriptive account of Job Seeker's Allowance (JSA) sanction rates and contrast trends before and after October 2012, the month which marked the introduction of a new JSA sanctioning regime, characterised by more severe and lengthened sanctions.

KEY POINTS

- JSA adverse sanction rates increased considerably after October 2012 across most of Jobcentre Plus offices (JPC) in Scotland.
- Across the board, sanction rates peaked in the period following October 2012 to subsequently decrease. In a number of JCP offices in Scotland, post-2012 sanction rate levels do not revert to pre-2012 levels.
- From a visual inspection of patterns of JSA sanction rates, it is not possible to detect any consistent differences between JCP offices over time.
- Hence this descriptive account, which is based on aggregate data on JSA sanction rates, does not seem to provide any evidence in support of the claim that there may be differences in the cultural environment operating within different JCP offices.
- Individual-level data is needed to ascertain whether there are any 'cultural' differences towards sanctioning between JCP offices.

BACKGROUND

Activation policies, aimed at helping unemployed people to rapidly move or return to work, is considered a prominent feature of the UK welfare system. Since the 1980s, eligibility criteria for unemployed benefits have required claimants to be both available for work and actively seeking work. The introduction of the Job Seeker's Allowance (JSA) in October 1996 marked a tightening of job-search requirements, through the establishment of fortnightly job-search monitoring meetings and participation in government programmes aimed at improving employability. The introduction of JSA also entailed the enforcement of sanctions with the reduction, suspension or withdrawal of benefits in case of claimants' non-compliance. Starting from the early 2000s, job-search requirements and monitoring have

been progressively extended to other groups, such as lone parents, claimants of incapacity benefits and partners of benefit claimants.

More recently, reforms of the JSA regime have led to a further tightening of the monitoring of job-search activities while concurrently extending the use of sanctions to ensure behavioural compliance. With the implementation of a new JSA sanctioning regime in October 2012, the minimum length of sanction episodes has increased from one week to four weeks. This applies for 'low-level' non-compliance, for instance, when JSA claimants fail to attend a job-search review meeting or to participate in a training programme. The maximum length of sanctions has increased from 26 weeks to three years, which applies for 'high-level' non-compliance or repeated failure, such as the case when JSA claimants repeatedly fail to apply for or take up a suitable job, or alternatively lose a job due to misconduct (OECD, 2014a; Watts, Fitzpatrick, Bramley and Watkins, 2014).

Since its institution in 2002, Jobcentre Plus (JCP) has played a key role in providing advisory services to enable the job matching process of unemployed people to available vacancies. JCP also contributes to enhancing jobseekers' employability and their employment opportunities by providing guidance and support through more tailored services, such as in-depth counselling interviews and referral to active labour market programmes and training programmes.

Caseworkers (also known as 'employment advisors' or 'work coaches') play a major role in delivering JCP services. In particular, decisions adopted by caseworkers may affect the labour market outcomes of benefit claimants. One possible way in which this can occur is, for example, through the initial assessment conducted by caseworkers at registration of a benefit claim. Initial assessments are usually performed to identify different groups of claimants, based on their different levels of needs of support. For instance, claimants who are initially evaluated as at risk of long-term unemployment may be allocated to specific services and programmes to help them increase their employability. In conducting initial assessments and tailoring monitoring plans for groups of claimants with different needs and barriers to work, caseworkers in JCP local offices operate with a substantial degree of discretion as well-defined and articulated formal profiling procedures are absent (OECD, 2014a: p. 126). Moreover, caseworkers have a dual role as they provide benefit claimants with support and advice in their search for work, whilst at the same time they are also required to monitor their clients' job-search efforts and refer them for sanctions when specific behavioural requirements, such as attending review appointments, are not met. Hence, caseworkers may differ in their advisory and monitoring styles and this will depend on different factors, such as access to available resources at the level of local JCP offices and personal and attitudinal characteristics. The combination of these multiple factors may have different repercussions on the labour market outcomes of benefit claimants registered in JCP offices in different geographical areas.

International evidence of the effects of caseworkers in public employment agencies on benefit sanctions is rather scant and displays a certain degree of ambiguity. To date, the only studies available tend to focus on the duration of unemployment benefits (an overview of studies that are discussed in the following is presented in table 1 in Appendix). For Switzerland, a study by Behncke, Frölich and Lechner (2010) revealed that unemployment

benefit recipients, who were allocated to less supportive caseworkers at registration, had a higher propensity to make a transition back to employment and had more stable jobs. No differences were observed in terms of use of longer sanctions and referrals to active labour market programmes. In a more recent study, Huber, Lechner and Mellace (2014) were able to decompose the caseworker's effect into an indirect effect (i.e. via the assignment of benefit recipients to active labour market programmes) and a direct effect (e.g. via the use of sanctions, exertion of pressure to accept jobs and personal traits pertaining to counselling style). However, the authors did not find any significant effect related to the allocation of benefit recipients to active labour market programmes, whereas they found a positive and significant direct effect which levelled off over time. Drawing on Swiss unemployment register data linked to information on earnings from social security administrative data, Arni, Lalive and van Ours (2013) distinguished between 'ex-ante effects', which were related to sanction warnings, and 'ex-post effects', related to sanctions enforcement. The study revealed higher exit rates from unemployment for both recipients to whom a sanction was imposed and for those who were not sanctioned after receiving a warning. For both groups, higher transitions back to employment occurred at a cost of reduced post-unemployment earnings. However, only sanctioned claimants experienced higher levels of discontinuous employment, suggesting that the negative effects of benefit sanctions can be attenuated by combining a reduction in the severity of benefit sanctions (enforcement) and an increase in monitoring intensity (warning).

In the case of Germany a study by Müller (2007), using integrated individual- and regional-level administrative data, reported that the probability of receiving unemployment benefit sanctions varies significantly at a regional level. According to the author, this result seems to point to the existence of differences in the implementation of activation policies across local employment agencies. In a different study, Loopstra, Reeves, McKee and Stuckler (2015) utilised aggregated data at local authority level for the United Kingdom and fixed-effect models correcting for geospatial correlation. Despite finding a considerable variation in total sanction referral rates (including decisions rates for adverse, non-adverse and cancellation/reserved decisions) across local authorities, the authors failed to detect any association between sanctioning rates and overall local-authority level employment and unemployment rates. A more recent study for Germany by Schmieder and Trenkle (2016), who used a regression discontinuity design to analyse individual-level administrative data matched with caseworkers' information, demonstrated that caseworkers do not act differently on the basis of different level of eligibility of benefit recipients. In other words, caseworkers do not seem to shift resources according to the different needs and eligibility characteristics of recipients.

In this descriptive working paper, I address the following two research questions:

1. Is there a variation in Job Seeker's Allowance (JSA) sanction rates before and after the introduction of a new Sanctioning Regime which occurred in October 2012?
2. Is there a variation in JSA sanction rates by Jobcentre Plus (JCP) offices in Scotland?

The remaining part of the document is organised as follows. In the next section, I will describe the data and method used. Subsequently, I will present the main findings derived

from descriptive visualisations of trends based in adverse sanction rates by Jobcentre Plus from Scottish aggregate data for the period before and after October 2012. In the final section I will present a brief discussion and concluding remarks.

DATA AND METHODS

I used aggregated monthly data on JSA adverse sanction and claimant count (seasonally adjusted) for 93 Jobcentre Plus (JCP) offices in Scotland, covering the period from April 2000 to September 2015, the latest available data point at the time when the analyses were conducted. The monthly data for JSA adverse sanctions were obtained from the UK Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) database 'JSA Sanction Decisions - all decisions made' (DWP, 2016a). The monthly data on claimants count were retrieved from the Official Labour Market Statistics (Nomis) database, which is run by the University of Durham on behalf of the Office for National Statistics (ONS, 2016). Monthly counts for JCP offices from the two data sources were harmonised. Two JCP offices (St. Andrews and Fraserburgh) were excluded as they constitute outliers (for details, see figure 1 in Appendix, pp.22 and 25). Note that during the period covered by the collected data, there have been considerable changes to JCP offices, with existing offices closing, or merging with other offices, and new offices opening. It is possible that the rapid changes in the landscape of JCP offices may have given rise to recording errors in both adverse sanction and claimant counts. While it was not possible to correct for these sources of errors, the data was harmonised to the best of my knowledge by taking into account overtime changes that occurred in JCP offices, with some of these – for instance - becoming dormant or inactive after a period or being merged into pre-existing offices. Details of the choices taken while harmonising the data can be seen in table 2 in Appendix.

The UK sanctioning system is complex. A referral for a sanction is usually issued by a caseworker (or employment advisor) at a JCP office, or a member of staff of a Work Programme provider¹. Generally a sanction referral occurs when a JSA claimant fails to comply with a mandatory requirement of benefit receipt, for instance by missing a mandatory appointment with a JCP caseworker or by failing to take part in a Work Programme. The referral is then reviewed by a specialised decision maker, who is located in a different office from the JCP office of the front-line caseworker. The decision maker has the task to decide on whether or not to impose a sanction. A JSA benefit recipient who has received a sanction has the option to ask for a reconsideration of the decision² and, in the case the original decision is upheld, claimants are given the opportunity to appeal the decision in court (Oakley, 2014; OECDa, 2014).

¹ The Work Programme was introduced in June 2011 and was largely characterised by the expansion of a quasi-market approach in the delivery of employment services for several groups of clients, including the long-term unemployed (OECDb, 2014).

² According to Webster (2016a, p. 9), following the introduction of mandatory reconsideration in October 2013, the share of JSA sanction which were challenged declined while, at the same time, the share of successful challenges increased. As a result, the share of sanctions which are overturned remained unaltered.

A sanction referral can lead to four possible decision outcomes (DWP, 2016b):

1. A decision to apply a sanction (adverse) constitutes an unfavourable outcome for the JSA claimant and can be made at different stages, i.e. at original decision-making, reconsideration or following an appeal.
2. A decision not to apply a sanction (non-adverse) constitutes a favourable outcome for the claimant and can be made at any stage as for adverse sanction decisions (see point 1 above).
3. A reserved decision refers to a case where a sanction cannot be imposed because the claimant has interrupted a JSA claim.
4. A cancelled referral refers to a cancelled decision occurring in specific circumstances, for instance when the decision-maker has failed to obtain further documentation following a request to the original JCP office and it is not possible to obtain the required information from another source.

The focus of this working paper is on adverse sanctions. In particular, following the harmonisation of adverse sanction and claimant count data³, I first constructed a sanction rate, computed as the ratio of total adverse sanction decisions over the total number of benefit claimants in each quarter (i.e. three-month period) in each JCP local office in Scotland. I then went on to create an indicator of change in sanction rates, calculated as the difference between a given sanction rate for a specific JCP office in a given quarter and the average sanction rate for all JCP offices in Scotland measured at October 2012, time point in which major reforms of the JSA sanctioning regime occurred.

Differences in sanction rates relative to October 2012 were visualised by implementing ‘Lowess’ command (Cleveland, 1979; Cleveland and Devlin, 1988) in Stata/MP version 12.1. ‘Lowess’ command performs a locally weighted regression of a dependent variable (in this study: differences in sanction rates compared to October 2012) on an independent variable (yearly quarters). By using a non-parametric approach - which relaxes the linearity assumptions of conventional regression methods - separate regression models are fitted to a cluster of neighbouring observations to any given data point, provided by sanction rate differences for each successive quarter. The width of the cluster of neighbouring observations is determined by using the option bandwidth. Note that the greater the bandwidth, the greater the smoothing of the regression function. In this working paper, all the plots that are presented in the next section and appendix were obtained by using bandwidth (0.1). This means that 10 percent of the data were used to estimate the locally weighted regressions.

MAIN FINDINGS

Figure 1 shows the trends in differences in sanction rates compared to October 2012 (indicated by the vertical grey dashed line) across 92 JCP offices, covering 17 geographical


³ Note that starting from May 2013, the claimant count data published in ONS Nomis database include the number of people claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance plus those who claim Universal Credit and are out of work (ONS, 2015).

areas and 4 JCP Districts in Scotland⁴. Negative differences, illustrated by trends located below the grey horizontal bar, indicate that observed sanction rates were lower than the average computed over all JCP offices in October 2012. Positive differences for trends above the grey horizontal bar mean that sanction rates exceeded the average sanction rate at October 2012.

Two main observations can be highlighted. First, during the period prior to October 2012, a consistent finding across the majority of JCP offices is that changes in sanction rates were negative. This means that sanction rates prior to October 2012 were below the average sanction rate over all JCP offices, as measured in October 2012. In most cases, changes in sanction rates followed a non-linear pattern although with an increasing gradient, as time approached October 2012. A peak in differences in sanction rates was observed around October 2012 and in the immediately following period, with trends either approaching the zero threshold (indicated by the red horizontal bar) or exceeding it, denoting that current sanction rates were either equal or greater than the overall average computed for October 2012. In the most recent period, a decreasing trend was observed. However, in a number of cases, levels in sanction-rate differences, recorded for the latest available quarters in 2015, did not reach those observed at the outset of the illustrated trends.


⁴ Note that while the levels of JCP offices and districts were originally present in the collected data, the intermediate level of geographical areas (broadly covering Local Authorities boundaries) was introduced to ease the comparison across numerous JCP offices belonging to different JCP districts.

Figure 1. Differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, geographical areas and JCP districts compared to October 2012; Scotland, June 2000 – September 2015



Source: Our computations based on data from DWP Stat-Xplore (DWP, 2016a) and Nomis databases (ONS, 2016).

Figure 1. (cont.) Differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, geographical areas and JCP districts compared to October 2012; Scotland, June 2000 – September 2015



Source: Our computations based on data from DWP Stat-Xplore (DWP, 2016a) and Nomis databases (ONS, 2016).

Second, from a visual inspection of overall changes in sanction rates before and after October 2012, it was not possible to detect any consistent differences or variation across JCP offices within different JCP areas and districts. Hence, the descriptive account of patterns of quarterly changes in sanction rates, based on the aggregated data illustrate in figure 1, does not seem to provide any evidence in support of the claim, emerged from the literature, of an existence of differences in the cultural environment at local JCP offices. Plausibly, the information channelled by aggregated data may not be sufficient to detect persistent differences across JCP offices. Individual longitudinal data, including information on the sanction histories of JSA benefit claimants and their contacts with allocated caseworkers or employment advisors at the JCP office, may offer an important opportunity to disentangle the role played by individual characteristics and resources from the role played by the cultural context at the level of local JCP offices.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

The descriptive account of changes in JSA adverse sanction rates across JCP offices in Scotland, which this working paper covers, is part of an exercise that was conducted to ascertain the existence of different patterns across different JCP offices, areas and JCP districts.

The aim of the descriptive exercise was to address two distinct research questions. First, on the basis of available aggregate quarterly data for Scotland, is it possible to identify a variation in JSA sanction rates before and after October 2012? This date marks the introduction of a new sanction regime in UK, which was characterised by a further tightening of behavioural requirements for JSA claimants and an expanded use of punitive sanctions to enforce behavioural compliance. Second, is it possible to identify a variation in JSA sanction rates across different JCP offices, located in different areas and JCP districts? The idea here is that differences in sanction rates across JCP offices may reflect contextual differences in terms of style and approach to sanctioning prevailing between JCP offices. Findings show that JSA adverse sanction rates increased substantially after October 2012 across most JCP offices in Scotland. Across the board, sanction rates peaked in the period following October 2012 to subsequently decrease. This result is consistent with other reports based on aggregated UK data (Loopstra et al., 2015; Webster, 2016b). However, no consistent differences in benefit sanction rates emerged across JCP offices located in different areas or JCP districts. Hence, no evidence was found in support of the claim that there may be differences in the cultural environment operating within different JCP offices. This is in contrast to other studies, for the UK and Germany, which found considerable geographical variation in sanction rates which may be linked to differences in sanction implementation across local employment offices (Loopstra et al. 2015; Müller, 2007). An emerging body of studies, based on individual administrative data, report contrasting evidence. On the one hand, a significant and positive effect in the allocation of benefit claimants was found for Switzerland at the level of the caseworker or employment advisor in terms of adopted monitoring style, use of sanctions and exertion of pressure to accept jobs (Huber et al., 2014). On the other hand, no differences were detected between caseworkers or employment advisors in terms of use of sanctions or in allocating different

benefit claimants according to their different needs or characteristics (see Behncke et al. (2010) for Switzerland, and Schmieder and Trenkle (2016) for Germany).

Further research, using individual-level data and adopting a quasi-experimental design, is needed in order to ascertain the existence of a caseworker or employment advisor's effect and disentangle the different mechanisms leading to the adoption of different sanctioning implementation styles and approaches within local employment offices. There is also a need to investigate the wider and long-term consequences of benefit sanctions for claimants and their families in terms of employment outcomes, education, poverty and social exclusion, housing and crime.

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APPENDIX

Table 1. Overview of quantitative studies on the effects of benefit sanctions: Regional variations and the role of caseworkers and monitoring mechanisms

Study	Country	Data	Outcome	Method	Main findings
Arni, Lalive and van Ours, 2013	Switzerland	Swiss unemployment insurance register, 1998-2003; social security administrative data, 1993-2002	Employment stability and earnings following unemployment insurance episode	Multivariate mixed proportional hazard model	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The study identifies ex-ante effects and ex-post effects of benefit sanctions. Ex-ante effects refer to claimants who received warnings of a sanction without its enforcement, whereas ex-post effects refers to claimants who received a warning followed by a sanction. - Both sanctioned and non-sanctioned claimants are more likely to leave unemployment, although at a cost of reduced post-unemployment earnings. However, only sanctioned claimants experienced lower employment duration or discontinuous employment compared to non-sanctioned claimants. - According to the authors, the negative effects of benefit sanctions can be improved by combining a reduction in the severity of benefit sanctions and an increase in monitoring intensity.
Behncke, Frölick and Lechner, 2010	Switzerland	Swiss unemployment insurance register, 2003-2006; survey data on caseworkers, 2003-2004	Transition to employment/employment stability following registration for unemployment insurance	Non-parametric propensity score matching estimation model	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Benefit claimants, who were allocated to less supportive caseworkers at registration, had faster transitions to employment in the short term, compared to benefit claimants assigned to more lenient caseworkers. - Moreover, claimants with less supportive caseworkers revealed a higher propensity to have more stable jobs. - No significant effect was reported in terms of reliance of longer sanctions or referral to active labour market programmes.
Huber, Lechner and Mellace, 2014	Switzerland	Swiss unemployment insurance register, 2003-2006; survey data on caseworkers, 2003-2004	Transition to employment/employment stability following registration for unemployment insurance	Semi-parametric mediation analysis, propensity score matching estimation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The study allows for the decomposition of the caseworker's effect into an indirect effect through the assignment to active labour market programmes and a residual direct effect, which may include the use of sanctions, pressure to accept jobs and other personal traits pertaining to the counselling style. - Results show that the indirect effect exerted by less supportive caseworkers – through referrals to training schemes/active labour market programmes – on claimants' transitions to employment is not significant. - Conversely, the direct effect appears to be positive and levelling off over time.

Table 1. (cont.) Overview of quantitative studies on the effects of benefit sanctions: Regional variations and the role of caseworkers and monitoring mechanisms

Study	Country	Data	Outcome	Method	Main findings
Lalive, Zwimüller and van Ours, 2005	Switzerland	Swiss unemployment insurance register, 1997-1999	Exit from unemployment	Multivariate mixed proportional hazard model	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The analyses allow for ex-ante and ex-post effects of benefit sanctions to be distinguished. - The exit rate of non-sanctioned benefit recipients is strongly affected by the intensity of the sanction policy. - Results suggest that benefit sanctions lead to rapid exit rates from unemployment. - Moreover, a stricter sanction regime is positively correlated with a reduction of unemployment also for the non-sanction recipients (ex-ante effect). - The combination of both more intensive monitoring of job-search activities and an enforcement of search behaviour through sanctions may prove effective in reducing unemployment duration.
Loopstra, Reeves, McKee and Stuckler, 2015	United Kingdom	Aggregated data at Local Authority level from UK Department of Work and Pension (Stat-Xplore database) 2005-2014; Office of National Statistics Official Labour Market Statistics database (Nomis), 2005-2014	Sanction rate (total number of adverse sanctions per working age adult in each local authority)	Fixed effects regression model, correcting for geospatial correlation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A widespread variation is detected in the sanction referral rates for Job Seeker's Allowance (JSA) across local authorities. - The association between adverse sanctions and the rate of exit from JSA, although existed before the introduction of Welfare Reforms which began in 2011, became three times stronger in the following period. - Nearly 20 percent of those exiting unemployment benefits, while having received an adverse sanction, reported finding work whereas the remaining 80 percent left for destinations unrelated to work. - No association was detected between sanctioning rates and increasing employment or decreasing unemployment across local authorities.

Table 1. (cont.) Overview of quantitative studies on the effects of benefit sanctions: Regional variations and the role of caseworkers and monitoring mechanisms

Study	Country	Data	Outcome	Method	Main findings
Müller, 2007	Germany	Integrated Employment Biographies, German Social Security system, 2001-2002; regional-level data for employment agencies, 2000-2004	Transition to unemployment benefit sanctions	Multilevel discrete-time hazard rate model	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - At the individual level, younger unemployment benefit recipients have faster transitions to a sanction episode, compared to older benefit recipients. Disabled recipients and those holding a university degree display a slower entry into benefit sanctions. Moreover, the benefit level is negatively correlated with the imposition of sanctions, whereas having experienced repeated episodes of sanctions is positively related to the current risk of sanctions across genders and benefit cohorts. - At the regional level, the average unemployment duration is negatively correlated with benefit sanctions risks, whereas both the vacancy rate and the size of the secondary labour market display a positive correlation with benefit sanction transitions. This means that the probability of receiving a benefit sanction is greater when labour market conditions are more favourable. Moreover, unobserved heterogeneity at the regional level is significant, suggesting that differences in the implementation of the activation policies across local employment agencies matter in benefit sanction outcomes.
Schmieder and Trenkle, 2016	Germany	Integrated Employment Biographies, German Social Security system, 2008-2010; data on caseworkers	Unemployment insurance generosity (different indicators)	Regression discontinuity model	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Caseworkers do not appear to respond differently to differences across unemployed workers based on unemployment insurance eligibility. In other words, caseworkers do not seem to focus resources on disadvantaged unemployed people who approach the exhaustion of their unemployment benefits. This holds across a number of caseworker's activities, including the number of contacts with unemployment benefit claimants and the use of sanctions. - Only a small and positive effect was detected for caseworkers referring benefit recipients with shorter eligibility close to the exhaustion point to active labour market programmes, leading to the extension of their unemployment benefit.

Table 2. List of JCP offices (and codes) by geographical area and JCP district

JCP offices by geographical area and JCP district	Code provided in NOMIS	Notes on merged JCP offices (when code is provided, data on both DWP Stat-Xplore and NOMIS were merged)
(a) EAST AND SOUTH EAST OF SCOTLAND		
1. Edinburgh		
Edinburgh City/High Riggs	10585	Period data mostly reflect High Riggs (10578 Edinburgh A in NOMIS) which is currently dormant; Edinburgh City (South St Andrew St.) opened recently (January 2010); 10572 Torpichen
Edinburgh Commercial St./Leith	10573	10577 Portobello
Wester Hailes	10887	
2. Lothian		
Musselburgh	10575	10671 Haddington
Bathgate	10891	10890 Z Bathgate B (NOMIS) or Bathgate Whitburn Rd (DWP)
Dalkeith	10570	
Livingston	10872	
Broxburn	10892	
3. Borders		
Galashiels	10780	Galashiels (Market Street and New River House – DWP); Peebles Northgate (DWP only) 10772 Kelso
Penicuik	10576	10574 Loanhead
Hawick	10770	
Eyemouth	10652	
4. Fife		
Cupar	10684	
Dunfermline	10685	Dunfermline (High St and Merchiston House – DWP)
Kirkcaldy	10688	
Glenrothes	10687	
Leven	10690	
Cowdenbeath	10683	
St Andrews	10692	Outlier: excluded.
5. Forth Valley / Central		
Stirling	10795	Stirling (St Ninians Rd and Wallage House, DWP)
Falkirk	10792	Falkirk (Grahame House, High St and Wellside Place – DWP) 10591 Boness 10790 Denny
Grangemouth	10793	
Alloa	10604	

Table 2. (cont.) List of JCP offices (and codes) by geographical area and JCP district

JCP offices by geographical area and JCP district	Code provided in NOMIS	Notes on merged JCP offices (when code is provided, data on both DWP Stat-Xplore and NOMIS were merged)
(b) NORTH OF SCOTLAND		
6a. Tayside 1		
Dundee Gellatly St.	10626	
Dundee Wellgate House	10624	
Perth	10755	
Montrose	10627	
6b. Tayside 2		
Arbroath	10620	
Blairgowrie	10751	
Forfar	10625	
7. Highlands		
Inverness	10702	Inverness (Metropolitan House and Young St, DWP; 10704 Inverness B merged with 10702 Inverness A, NOMIS) 10606 Nairn
Wick	10661	10660 Thurso
Dingwall	10764	
Invergordon	10761	
Fort William	10701	Recently dormant.
8a. Grampian 1		
Aberdeen Chapel St.	10616	Aberdeen Greyfriars House (DWP, currently dormant): merged with Aberdeen Chapel St., currently dormant.
Aberdeen C	10619	Named as Aberdeen Ebury House in DWP
Forres	10731	
Elgin	10730	
8b. Grampian 2		
Petehead	10615	
Buckie	10641	
Banff	10640	
Fraserburgh	10612	Outlier: excluded.
9. Islands		
Stornoway	10762	
Lerwick	10608	
Portree	10703	
Kirkwall	10607	

Table 2. (cont.) List of JCP offices (and codes) by geographical area and JCP district

JCP offices by geographical area and JCP district	Code provided in NOMIS	Notes on merged JCP offices (when code is provided, data on both DWP Stat-Xplore and NOMIS were merged)
(c) WEST OF SCOTLAND		
10. Argyll and Bute (Clyde Coast)		
Dunoon	10631	
Oban	10633	
Rothesay	10603	
Campbeltown	10630	Sparsed observations.
Helensburgh	10824	Helensburgh (Charlotte St and West Clyde St, DWP, merged).
11. West Dunbartonshire		
Clydebank	10822	
Alexandria	10820	
Dumbarton	10823	Dumbarton (Bridge St and Meadowbank St, DWP)
12. Renfrewshire and Inverclyde		
Paisley	10883	Paisley (High St and Lonend, DWP).
Renfrew	10885	10588 Renfrew and Inverclyde
Johnstone	10882	
Barrhead	10880	
Greenock	10501	
Port Glasgow	10884	
13. Dumfries and Galloway		
Dumfries	10531	Castle Douglas Carlingwalk St. (DWP only) Sanquhar – Queensberry Sq. (DWP only)
Annan	10530	Lockerbie High St. (DWP only)
Stranraer	10601	Newton Stewart (DWP only)
14a. Ayrshire 1		
Girvan	10507	
Saltcoats	10801	10811 Kilwinning 10512 Largs
Kilmarnock	10812	10810 Kilmarnock ESJ merged
Ayr	10502	Ayr (Carrick St and Wallacetoun House, DWP) 10518 Troon
14b. Ayrshire 2		
Cumnock	10504	
Irvine	10808	
Kilbirnie	10809	


Table 2. (cont.) List of JCP offices (and codes) by geographical area and JCP district

JCP offices by geographical area and JCP district	Code provided in NOMIS	Notes on merged JCP offices (when code is provided, data on both DWP Stat-Xplore and NOMIS were merged)
(d) GLASGOW, LANARKSHIRE AND EAST DUNBARTONSHIRE		
15a. Glasgow 1		
Partick	10558	
Glasgow Shawlands	10545	Glasgow Newlands (DWP only) 10548 Glasgow Auldhouse 10587 Hillington
Parkhead	10552	
Maryhill	10554	
Castlemilk	10859	
15b. Glasgow 2		
Langside	10584	
Anniesland	10560	
Bridgeton	10541	Named as Glasgow Muslin St. (DWP)
Govan	10549	
Easterhouse	10556	
15c. Glasgow 3		
Laurieston	10553	Named as Glasgow Pollockshaws Rd (DWP)
Springburn	10561	Named as Glasgow Atlas Rd (DWP) Glasgow Wellfield St (DWP only)
Drumchapel	10550	
Shettleston	10544	Glasgow Main St. (DWP only)
16. South Lanarkshire		
Lanark	10852	10842 Carluke
East Kilbride	10845	
Hamilton	10850	10566 Blantyre 10863 Uddingston 10853 Larkhall
Rutherglen	10858	
Cambuslang	10842	
17. North Lanarkshire and East Dunbartonshire		
Motherwell	10856	Motherwell (Flemington House and Mason St., DWP) 10860 Shotts 10864 Wishaw ESJ
Bellshill	10565	
Airdrie	10840	10844 Coatbridge
Cumbernauld	10821	10794 Kilysth
Kirkintilloch	10825	

Note: Glasgow City (NOMIS) Glasgow – Argyle St. (DWP): deleted – no sanctions/claimants;
 Glasgow Central House (DWP): deleted no sanctions/claimants;
 Glasgow Provan (DWP) 10506 Provan JC+ (NOMIS): deleted – no sanctions/claimants;


Figure 1. Scatterplot and smoothed trend from locally weighted regression (lowess) for differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, geographical areas and JCP districts compared to October 2012; Scotland, June 2000 – September 2015

(a) East and South East of Scotland




Source: Our computations based on data from DWP Stat-Xplore (DWP, 2016a) and Nomis databases (ONS, 2016).

Figure 1. (cont.) Scatterplot and smoothed trend from locally weighted regression (lowess) for differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, geographical areas and JCP districts compared to October 2012; Scotland, June 2000 – September 2015



Source: Our computations based on data from DWP Stat-Xplore (DWP, 2016a) and Nomis databases (ONS, 2016).


Figure 1. (cont.) Scatterplot and smoothed trend from locally weighted regression (lowess) for differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, geographical areas and JCP districts compared to October 2012; Scotland, June 2000 – September 2015



Source: Our computations based on data from DWP Stat-Xplore (DWP, 2016a) and Nomis databases (ONS, 2016).


Figure 1. (cont.) Scatterplot and smoothed trend from locally weighted regression (lowess) for differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, geographical areas and JCP districts compared to October 2012; Scotland, June 2000 – September 2015

(b) North of Scotland




Source: Our computations based on data from DWP Stat-Xplore (DWP, 2016a) and Nomis databases (ONS, 2016).

Figure 1. (cont.) Scatterplot and smoothed trend from locally weighted regression (lowess) for differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, geographical areas and JCP districts compared to October 2012; Scotland, June 2000 – September 2015



Source: Our computations based on data from DWP Stat-Xplore (DWP, 2016a) and Nomis databases (ONS, 2016).


Figure 1. (cont.) Scatterplot and smoothed trend from locally weighted regression (lowess) for differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, geographical areas and JCP districts compared to October 2012; Scotland, June 2000 – September 2015



Source: Our computations based on data from DWP Stat-Xplore (DWP, 2016a) and Nomis databases (ONS, 2016).

Figure 1. (cont.) Scatterplot and smoothed trend from locally weighted regression (lowess) for differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, geographical areas and JCP districts compared to October 2012; Scotland, June 2000 – September 2015

(c) West of Scotland




Source: Our computations based on data from DWP Stat-Xplore (DWP, 2016a) and Nomis databases (ONS, 2016).

Figure 1. (cont.) Scatterplot and smoothed trend from locally weighted regression (lowess) for differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, geographical areas and JCP districts compared to October 2012; Scotland, June 2000 – September 2015




Source: Our computations based on data from DWP Stat-Xplore (DWP, 2016a) and Nomis databases (ONS, 2016).

Figure 1. (cont.) Scatterplot and smoothed trend from locally weighted regression (lowess) for differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, geographical areas and JCP districts compared to October 2012; Scotland, June 2000 – September 2015




Source: Our computations based on data from DWP Stat-Xplore (DWP, 2016a) and Nomis databases (ONS, 2016).

Figure 1. (cont.) Scatterplot and smoothed trend from locally weighted regression (lowess) for differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, geographical areas and JCP districts compared to October 2012; Scotland, June 2000 – September 2015




Source: Our computations based on data from DWP Stat-Xplore (DWP, 2016a) and Nomis databases (ONS, 2016).

Figure 1. (cont.) Scatterplot and smoothed trend from locally weighted regression (lowess) for differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, geographical areas and JCP districts compared to October 2012; Scotland, June 2000 – September 2015



Source: Our computations based on data from DWP Stat-Xplore (DWP, 2016a) and Nomis databases (ONS, 2016).

Figure 1. (cont.) Scatterplot and smoothed trend from locally weighted regression (lowess) for differences in quarterly JSA adverse sanction rates by JCP offices, geographical areas and JCP districts compared to October 2012; Scotland, June 2000 – September 2015



Source: Our computations based on data from DWP Stat-Xplore (DWP, 2016a) and Nomis databases (ONS, 2016).



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